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Abst ract  
I n Burden v. UK, elderly cohabit ing sisters unsuccessfully challenged their exclusion 
from  civil partnerships. They claim ed this exclusion was a violat ion of the 
prohibit ion of discrim inat ion (Art icle 14)  and the r ight  to peaceful enjoym ent  of 
property (Art icle 1 of Protocol 1)  under the European Convent ion on Human Rights 
because the surviving sister would be liable to pay inheritance tax whereas a 
lesbian couple could avoid this liabilit y by registering a civil partnership. The facts 
of the case and the judgm ents by both the Cham ber and Grand Cham ber of the 
European Court  of Hum an Rights raise interest ing quest ions about  the extent  to 
which it  is just ifiable to base legal protect ions on conjugalit y. I n this paper, I  will 
explore these quest ions and consider how the judgm ent  could be rewrit ten from  a 
fem inist  perspect ive. 
Key w ords 
Conjugalit y;  art icle 14;  European Convent ion;  discrim inat ion;  inheritance tax;  civil 
partnership 
Resum en 
En Burden v. Reino Unido,  dos herm anas m ayores que vivían juntas no 
consiguieron im pugnar su exclusión de las uniones civiles. Argum entaban que esta 
exclusión suponía una violación de la prohibición de discrim inación (art ículo 14)  y 
del derecho al disfrute de los bienes (art ículo 1 del Protocolo 1)  en virtud del 
Convenio Europeo de Derechos Hum anos porque la herm ana superviviente estaría 
obligada a pagar el im puesto de sucesiones, m ient ras que una pareja de lesbianas 
podría evitar esta obligación m ediante el regist ro de una unión civil.  Los hechos del 
caso y las sentencias tanto de la Sala com o de la Gran Sala del Tribunal Europeo de 
Derechos Hum anos plantean cuest iones interesantes sobre el grado en el que es 
just ificable basar las protecciones jurídicas en la conyugalidad. En este art ículo se 
analizan estas cuest iones y se considera cóm o se podría reescribir la sentencia 
desde una perspect iva fem inista. 
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1 . I nt roduct ion 
The cases of Burden v. United Kingdom ,  heard in both the Cham ber (2007)  and the 
Grand Cham ber (2008)  of the European Court  of Hum an Rights were brought  by 
elderly sisters, neither of whom  had m arried or had children and who had lived 
together all their lives, the last  thirty years of which was in a four-bedroom  house 
built  on land inherited from  their parents. I t  appears that  they owned all their 
assets j oint ly and had each writ ten a will leaving her share to the surviving sister. 
Their total assets exceeded the exem pt ion threshold for inheritance tax and so the 
surviving sister would have to pay inheritance tax at  40%  of any am ount  over that  
threshold. Their claim  was that  the survivor ‘m ight  have to sell the house in order 
to pay the tax’ (Burden and Burden v. United Kingdom  2007, para. 11) ,  though as I  
out line below this appears very unlikely given the value of their assets in addit ion 
to the hom e. They argued that  the difference in t reatm ent  between them  and 
spouses/ civil partners const ituted discrim inat ion under Art icle 14 ECHR in 
conjunct ion with Art icle 1 of Protocol 1, the r ight  to peaceful enjoym ent  of property. 
I t  is an argum ent  that  has received a considerable am ount  of sym pathy, at  least  in 
principle, and part icularly from  those who had argued that  the Civil Partnership Act  
2004 should have been extended to siblings and other cohabit ing fam ily m em bers 
in order to provide a tax avoidance m echanism  for ‘deserving’ carers (see Barker 
2014 for an overview of these argum ents) . However, others have m ade m ore 
progressive argum ents for the principle of m oving ‘beyond conjugalit y’ (Law 
Com m ission of Canada 2001;  Polikoff 2008) , som e focusing on care rather than sex 
as the nexus of legally recognised and privileged relat ionships (Finem an 1995, 
2004;  Herring 2014) . The quest ion I  ask in this paper, loosely following the 
m ethodology of the Fem inist  Judgm ents Project  (FJP)  (see Hunter et  al. 2010) , is 
how m ight  a fem inist  j udge approach, or refram e, this case? 
I  differ from  the FJP in that  I  am  writ ing a com binat ion of com m entary on the case 
and an alternat ive fem inist  j udgm ent  because in m y view it  is im portant  to explain 
how I  am  ‘reading’ this case different ly as a fem inist  judge as well as writ ing it  
different ly. I n this respect , the st ructure that  this paper follows is sim ilar to that  of 
a separate project  re-writ ing judgm ents from  the European Court  of Hum an Rights 
(Brem s 2013) , though this lacked the explicit ly fem inist  approach of the FJP instead 
focusing on ‘m ainst ream ing diversity’ m ore broadly. Diversity was categorised 
under six headings:  children;  gender;  religious m inorit ies;  sexual m inorit ies;  
disabilit y;  and cultural m inorit ies. As such, m y analysis is different  to that  of Aeyal 
Gross who wrote an alternat ive judgm ent  in Burden for the lat ter project  (Gross 
2013) . For exam ple, Gross writes under the ‘sexual m inorit ies’ heading, focusing on 
the quest ion of privileging conjugalit y as his cent ral concern and finding the 
privileged econom ic status of the sisters to be im m aterial (Gross 2013, p. 266) . 
However, for m y m ore socialist  fem inist  approach, the privileging of conjugalit y and 
the wealth of the sisters are indivisible issues in this case. 
I  am  also differing from  the FJP’s convent ion that  j udgm ents should be writ ten as if 
at  the sam e t im e as the original j udgm ent , without  reference to subsequent  events 
and case law. The issue of recognising siblings for  the purposes of spousal 
privileges was reopened during the debates on the Marriage (Sam e Sex Couples)  
Bill 2013, with prom inent  fam ily lawyers, including Baroness But ler-Sloss, 
support ing Lady Deech’s proposed am endm ent  to the Bill to include in the 
subsequent  review of civil partnerships (which was to be m andated by the Act )  the 
quest ion of whether those within the prohibited degrees of relat ionship and carers 
should be eligible to becom e civil partners (HL Com m . 24 June 2013:  Colum n 528) . 
I n the press, Lady Deech referenced the Burden case and claim ed that  following 
sam e-sex m arriage:  ‘My bet  is that  a discrim inat ion case before the European Court  
of Hum an Rights would probably succeed because the Convent ion prohibits 
discrim inat ion by birth…’ ( interviewed in Bingham  2013) . Given the Grand 
Cham ber’s decision and reasoning in Burden 2008 this seem s highly unlikely but  in 
m y view it  is worth exploring whether there is a fem inist  argum ent  that  such a case 
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should succeed and how, if at  all,  a fem inist  judge m ight  rule in such a case if it  
were brought  today. Addit ionally, the recent  UK general elect ion results m ean that  
a Conservat ive m anifesto pledge to elim inate inheritance tax on estates worth up to 
£1 m illion and to exclude the fam ily hom e from  the calculat ion of those assets m ay 
well be im plem ented within the next  five years, bringing som e of the issues in this 
case once again to the forefront  of polit ical debate. 
2 . The European Court  of Hum an Rights Judgm ents 
I t  is st r iking that  while the Cham ber and Grand Cham ber ult im ately both ruled 
against  the Burden sisters, they did so for very different  reasons. With only a four 
to three m ajorit y, the Cham ber also appeared to be m ore sym pathet ic to the sisters 
than the fifteen to two m ajorit y in the Grand Cham ber. I t  is also worth not ing that  
in the later case the UK judge, Sir Nicholas Bratza, expressed in a concurring 
opinion his preference for  the reasoning of the m ajorit y in the Cham ber, rather than 
that  of the Grand Cham ber (Burden v. United Kingdom  2008, para O- I2) 1. 
The sisters claim ed that  they were discrim inated against  cont rary to Art icle 14 in 
their r ight  to property guaranteed by Art icle 1 of Protocol 1. Their claim  was 
unanim ously held to be adm issible in the Cham ber and likewise the UK 
governm ent ’s prelim inary object ions on the sam e grounds of failing to exhaust  
dom est ic rem edies and not  (yet )  being ‘vict im s’ of a violat ion of t he Convent ion 
were unanim ously dism issed in the Grand Cham ber. I  do not  revisit  these aspects 
of the judgm ent  because I  agree with the Court s’ analyses on these points, focusing 
only on the substant ive discrim inat ion claim . 
The subm issions m ade by the UK governm ent  and the Burden sisters in the 
Cham ber and Grand Cham ber were virtually ident ical (as reported in the respect ive 
judgm ents)  so I  have sum m arised them  only once and any m inor differences are 
noted in the sum m aries. 
2.1. The Governm ent ’s subm ission 
The UK Governm ent  denied that  there was any discrim inat ion because the sisters 
were not  in an analogous situat ion to spouses or civil partners;  while a couple 
chooses to becom e connected for the sisters it  was an accident  of birth. 
Furtherm ore, spouses and civil partners ‘m ade a financial com m itm ent  to each 
other ’, including giving powers to the courts to divide their property on separat ion 
and m ake financial orders, which does not  arise in a sibling relat ionship, and the 
‘special legal status’ of m arriage had been recognised by the Court  in Shackell v .  
United Kingdom  (2000, para 46) .  
I f the court  did consider the sisters to be analogous to spouses or civil partners, the 
Governm ent  argued that  the difference in t reatm ent  between them  was within the 
m argin of appreciat ion, which is wide in relat ion to taxat ion and financial m easures 
designed to prom ote m arriage:  
The policy underlying the inheritance tax concession given to m arr ied couples was 
to provide the survivor with a m easure of financial securit y, and thus prom ote 
m arr iage…. That  object ive would not  be served by extending sim ilar benefit s to 
unm arried m em bers of an exist ing fam ily, such as siblings, whose relat ionship was 
already established by their consanguinit y, and recognised by law. The difference in 
t reatment  thus pursued a legit im ate aim . (Shackell v. United Kingdom  2000, para 
47) . 
The Governm ent  also argued that  it  was proport ionate, as the applicants had not  
‘undertaken any of the burdens and obligat ions’ of m arriage/ civil partnership and 
that  extending the tax exem pt ion to siblings and other cohabit ing fam ily m em bers 
would have considerable financial im plicat ions. 
                                                 
1
 Henceforth, Burden v. United Kingdom (2008) will be cited as Burden (2008) and Burden and Burden 
v. United Kingdom  (2007) will be cited as Burden (2007) . 
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I n the Grand Cham ber, the governm ents of Belgium  and the Republic of I reland 
m ade third party subm issions in support  of the UK’s posit ion that  a state was 
ent it led to prom ote m arriage through it s tax system  (Belgium )  and that  the sisters 
were not  analogous to spouses or civil partners ( I reland) . 
2.2. The Burden sisters’ subm ission 
The sisters argued that  they were in an analogous situat ion to spouses and civil 
partners because they ‘had chosen to live together in a loving, com m it ted and 
stable relat ionship for  several decades, sharing their only hom e, t o the exclusion of 
other partners’ (Burden 2007, para 50) . The power of the court  to m ake financial 
and property orders at  t he end of a m arriage does not  m ean that  siblings are not  in 
an analogous posit ion to m arried couples for the purposes of inheritance tax, and in 
any case the sisters were prevented by law from  entering into a civil partnership on 
the grounds of consanguinity. I n the Grand Cham ber, the sisters clarified in their 
subm ission that :  
They had not  raised a general complaint  about  their  preclusion from entering into a 
civil partnership, because their concern was focussed upon inheritance tax 
discr im inat ion and they would have entered into a civil partnership had that  route 
been open to them . I t  was circular for the Governm ent  to hold against  the 
applicants the very fact  that  they cannot  enter into a civil partnership (Burden 
2008, para 53) . 
They further argued that  given that  the stated purpose of the inheritance 
exem pt ion was to prom ote stable and com m it ted relat ionships, denying it  to 
cohabit ing adult  siblings serves no legit im ate aim :  ‘only a sm all m inority of adult  
siblings were likely to share the type of relat ionship enjoyed by the applicants, 
involving prolonged m utual support , com m itment  and cohabitat ion’ (Burden 2007,  
para 51) . Extending the exem pt ion to siblings and other cohabit ing fam ily m em bers 
would ‘serve the policy interest… [ of]  the prom ot ion of stable, com m it ted fam ily 
relat ionships am ong adults’ and thus excluding them  did not  serve a legit im ate aim  
and was not  proport ionate (Burden 2007, para 52) .  
While they accepted that  it  was not  for the Court  to dictate potent ial rem edies, the 
sisters noted that  the proposed am endm ents to the Civil Partnership Bill,  passed by 
the House of Lords but  rem oved by the House of Com m ons, ‘showed that  it  would 
be possible to const ruct  a statutory schem e whereby two siblings or other close 
relat ions who had cohabited for a fixed num ber of years… could obtain certain fiscal 
r ights or advantages’ (Burden 2007, para 52) .  The sisters also claim ed that  given 
the recognit ion of the injust ice caused in these cases during the passage of the Civil 
Partnership Bill through Parliam ent , the Governm ent ’s reliance on the m argin of 
appreciat ion was m isplaced, and that  the Governm ent  had failed to provide an 
est im ate of the loss of f inancial revenue from  extending the exem pt ion. Finally, any 
lost  revenue ‘would have to be offset  by the potent ial gains, for exam ple, those 
flowing from  an increased tendency, encouraged by the exem pt ion, of close 
relat ions to care for disabled or elderly relat ives, thus avoiding the need for state 
funded care’ (Burden 2007, para 52) .  
2.3. The Cham ber judgm ent  
The Cham ber noted that , in line with the principle of subsidiarit y, there is a wide 
m argin of appreciat ion in the field of taxat ion, ‘as is usual when it  com es to general 
m easures of econom ic or social st rategy… [ because t ] he nat ional authorit ies are in 
principle bet ter  placed than the internat ional j udge to appreciate what  is in the 
public interest  on social or econom ic grounds’ (Burden 2007, para 54) .  As such, the 
Court  will generally only intervene in this area when the decision m ade at  nat ional 
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level is ‘m anifest ly without  reasonable foundat ion’2 or discrim inates between 
taxpayers cont rary to Art icle 14. 
I t  is not  the case that  all differences in t reatm ent  between those in sim ilar 
situat ions will be discrim inatory;  rather, a difference in t reatm ent  is only 
discrim inatory if ‘it  does not  pursue a legit im ate aim  or if there is not  a reasonable 
relat ionship of proport ionalit y between the m eans em ployed and the aim  sought  to 
be realised’ (Burden 2007, para 55) . The state also ‘enjoys a m argin of appreciat ion 
in assessing whether and to what  extent  differences in otherwise sim ilar situat ions 
just ify a different  t reatm ent ’ (Burden 2007, para 55) . 3 
The Cham ber m ust  first  decide whether the sisters are in a sim ilar situat ion to 
spouses and civil partners. This would be an uphill bat t le for the sisters because the 
Court  has previously held that  despite increased acceptance of relat ionships outside 
of m arriage, ‘the situat ions of m arried and unm arried heterosexual cohabit ing 
couples were not  analogous for the purposes of survivors’ benefit s’ (Burden 2007, 
para 57;  see Shackell v. United Kingdom  2000) . The Cham ber glossed over the 
quest ion of whether the fact  that  those who are not  within the prohibited degrees of 
relat ionship have a choice of whether or not  to m arry or becom e civil partners, 
whereas the sisters have no such choice, would m ake a difference to this line of 
case law by finding that  ‘even assum ing that  the applicants can be com pared to 
such a couple, the difference in t reatm ent  is not  inconsistent  with Art .14’ (Burden 
2007, para 58) .  
The Cham ber accepted the Governm ent ’s subm ission that  the inheritance tax 
exem pt ion for spouses and civil partners pursues the legit im ate aim  of prom ot ing 
stable, com m it ted, relat ionships:  ‘The State cannot  be crit icised for pursuing, 
through it s taxat ion system , policies designed to prom ote m arriage;  nor can it  be 
crit icised for m aking available the fiscal advantages at tendant  on m arriage to 
com m it ted hom osexual couples’ (Burden 2007,  para 59) .  
Furtherm ore, bearing in m ind both the legit im ate policy aim s of the exem pt ion and 
the wide m argin of appreciat ion in relat ion to taxat ion, it  is inevitable that  any 
taxat ion schem e will create ‘m arginal situat ions and individual cases of apparent  
hardship or injust ice’ but  it  is prim arily for the state to determ ine how to st r ike the 
appropriate balance:  
The legislature could have granted the inheritance tax concessions on a different  
basis:  in part icular it  could have abandoned the concept  of m arr iage or civil 
partnership as the determ inat ive factor and extended the concession to siblings or 
other fam ily mem bers who lived together, and/ or based the concession on such 
cr iteria as the period of cohabitat ion, the closeness of the blood relat ionship, the 
age of the part ies or the like. However, the cent ral quest ion under the Convent ion 
is not  whether different  cr iteria could have been chosen for the grant  of an 
inheritance tax exem pt ion, but  whether the schem e actually chosen by the 
legislature, to t reat  different ly for tax purposes those who were m arr ied or who 
were part ies to a civil partnership from  other persons living together, even in a 
long- term set t led relat ionship, exceeded any acceptable m argin of appreciat ion. 
(Burden 2007, para 60) .  
Unfortunately, the Cham ber does not  consider in any detail whether or not  siblings 
are sim ilarly situated to spouses, this being generally the first  quest ion in a 
discrim inat ion case. I nstead, it  glosses over this quest ion and it s focus turns quickly 
to the (usual)  second quest ion of j ust ificat ion. I n this case, the UK did not  exceed 
the m argin of appreciat ion and the difference in t reatm ent  between siblings and 
spouses or civil partners would be reasonably and object ively j ust ified, even if they 
were sim ilarly situated. Therefore the Cham ber concludes that  there was no 
violat ion of Art icle 14, read in conjunct ion with Art icle 1 of Protocol 1. 
                                                 
2
 Cit ing James v. United Kingdom (1986, para 46) , amongst  others. 
3
 Cit ing Stec v. United Kingdom (2006, para 51) . 
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2.3.1. Dissent ing judgm ents of Judges Bonello and Garlicki and Judge 
Pavlovschi 
I n their j oint  dissent ing opinion, Judges Bonello and Garlicki are not  convinced by 
the way in which the m ajorit y applied the m argin of appreciat ion in this case. While 
they agree that  there is a wide m argin on tax, they suggest  that  once the sisters 
were able to dem onst rate apparent  hardship or injust ice, the onus m ust  shift  back 
to the Governm ent  t o show good reasons for  t he different  t reatm ent  (Burden 2007, 
para O- I1) . The m ajorit y does not  give ‘a full explanat ion as to why and how such 
injust ice can be just ified’ in this case and ‘in the absence of such explanat ion, a 
problem  of discrim inatory t reatm ent  m ay arise, even outside the t radit ional arena 
of Convent ion r ights’ (Burden 2007, para O- I2;  cit ing Stec v. United Kingdom  2006, 
para 54-55) .  
They suggest  that  as long as the UK confined the exem pt ion to spouses the policy 
could have been just ified by reference to Art icle 12 ( the r ight  to m arry and found a 
fam ily)  but  that  once it  was extended to civil partners, ‘the problem  left  the specific 
sphere of Art icle 12’ and now has to ‘sat isfy general standards of reasonableness 
and non-arbit rariness result ing from  Art icle 14’ (Burden 2007, para O- I2) .  I n other 
words, now that  sam e-sex couples, who are civil partners rather t han spouses, 
have the tax exem pt ion, the Governm ent  m ust  be able to j ust ify why ‘it  has been 
offered to som e unions while cont inuing to be denied to others’ (Burden 2007, para 
O- I2) .  
Unlike the m ajorit y, Judges Bonello and Garlicki do dist inguish between couples, 
who are free to choose m arriage, and the sisters, who are not , and they em phasise 
the sim ilarit y between the sisters and spouses:  
The situat ion of perm anent ly cohabit ing siblings is in m any respects – em ot ional as 
well as economical – not  ent irely different  from  the situat ion of other unions, 
part icular ly as regards old or very old people. The bonds of m utual affect ion form 
the ethical basis for such unions and the bonds of m utual dependency form the 
social basis for them . I t  is very im portant  to protect  such unions, like any other 
union of two persons, from  financial disaster result ing from  the death of one of the 
partners (Burden 2007, para O- I3) .  
Although they accept  that  the Governm ent  m ay ‘establish a very high threshold’ for 
sibling relat ionships to be recognised, they reject  the idea that  they can ‘sim ply 
ignore that  such unions also exist ’ (Burden 2007, para O- I3) .  
They conclude by not ing that  the UK wants to collect  it s tax twice:  on the death of 
the first  sister, and again on the rem ains of the estate on the death of the second 
sister, which they find ‘is scarcely com pat ible with Art .14 taken in conjunct ion with 
Art .1 of Protocol No. 1’ and which ‘m ay also raise problem s under Art .8’ if the 
surviving sister would be com pelled to sell the hom e ‘or otherwise sacrifice the 
lifestyle to which she has been accustom ed’ (Burden 2007,  para O- I4) .  
Judge Pavolvschi dissents for a different  reason. He finds that  the m ajorit y ‘failed to 
adduce any reason or argum ent ’ for finding that  the UK did not  exceed the m argin 
of appreciat ion and that  the difference in t reatm ent  was reasonable and just ified 
(Burden 2007, para O- I I 4)  and as such he views their decision as unfair:  ‘I  am  
firm ly convinced that  a j udicial decision, which represents, by it s very nature, the 
highest  expression of j ust ice, cannot  be unfair ’ (Burden 2007, para O- I I 3) .  
He bases his view of the unfairness of the decision on the sisters’ em ot ional 
connect ion to the fam ily hom e and land:  
Had assets purchased by the applicants during their cohabitat ion been at  stake, I  
would have had no difficult y in accept ing the m ajority’s approach and, m oreover, I  
would have readily agreed that  part  of such shared assets, inherited by a surviving 
sibling, could and should be considered as taxable property. I n the case before us, 
however, we are faced with a qualitat ively different  situat ion. The case concerns 
the applicants’ fam ily house, in which they have spent  all their  lives and which t hey 
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built  on land inherited from  their late parents. This house is not  sim ply a piece of 
property – this house is som ething with which they have a special emot ional bond:  
this house is their  hom e. I t  st r ikes m e as absolutely awful that , once one of the two 
sisters dies, the surviving sister ’s suffer ings on account  of her closest  relat ive’s 
death should be m ult iplied by the r isk of losing her fam ily hom e because she cannot  
afford to pay inheritance tax in respect  of the deceased sister ’s share of it  (Burden 
2007, para O- I I 8-  9) .  
For this reason, he cannot  agree with the m ajorit y decision and places their 
j udgm ent  in the category of legal, but  unfair. 
2.4. The Grand Cham ber judgm ent  
Like the Cham ber, the Grand Cham ber finds that  the com plaint  does fall within the 
am bit  of Art icle 1 of Protocol 1 and that  Art icle 14 is therefore engaged (Burden 
2008, para 59) . I t  reiterates the well established rule that  in order for there to be 
discrim inat ion under Art icle 14 there m ust  be ‘a difference in the t reatm ent  of 
persons in relevant ly sim ilar situat ions’ and that  difference ‘has no object ive and 
reasonable just ificat ion’ (Burden 2008, para 60) . I t  also notes that  States enjoy a 
wide m argin of appreciat ion ‘in assessing whether and to what  extent  differences in 
otherwise sim ilar situat ions just ify a different  t reatm ent ’, in relat ion to econom ic or 
social st rategy (para 60) . While the Cham ber focussed on the lat ter  issues after  
glossing over the quest ion of whether the sisters were in a relevant  sim ilar situat ion 
to spouses or civil partners, the Grand Cham ber answers this first  quest ion in the 
negat ive and as a result  does not  find it  necessary to cont inue on to consider 
whether differences were just ified and within the m argin of appreciat ion. This was 
crit icised by the two dissent ing judges and one concurring judge (discussed below) . 
The reason that  the Grand Cham ber found that  the sisters were not  in a relevant ly 
sim ilar situat ion to spouses and civil partners was that  these relat ionships are 
‘qualitat ively of a different  nature’:  
The very essence of the connect ion between siblings is consanguinit y, whereas one 
of the defining characterist ics of a m arriage or Civil Partnership Act  union is that  it  
is forbidden to close fam ily m em bers. The fact  that  the applicants have chosen to 
live together all their  adult  lives, as do m any m arr ied and Civil Partnership Act  
couples, does not  alter this essent ial difference between the two types of 
relat ionship (Burden 2008, para 62) . 
They reiterated the ‘special status’ of m arriage and the Court ’s previous judgm ent  
in Shackell that  m arried and unm arried heterosexual couples are not  analogous 
because of that  special status (Burden 2008, para 63) . They also extended this 
special status to civil partners because the legal consequences of this status, which 
are expressly and deliberately entered into by the couple, ‘set  these types of 
relat ionship apart  from  other form s of cohabitat ion’ (Burden 2008,  para 65) .  I t  is 
the existence of a public undertaking, not  the length or support ive nature of the 
relat ionship, that  is determ inat ive:  j ust  as with unm arried cohabit ing couples, ‘the 
absence of such a legally binding agreem ent  between the applicants renders their 
relat ionship of cohabitat ion, despite it s long durat ion, fundam entally different  to 
that  of a m arried or civil partnership couple’ (para 65) . As such, the applicants 
cannot  be com pared to spouses or civil partners and there is therefore no violat ion 
of Art icle 14. 
2.4.1. Concurring opinions of Judge Bratza and Judge David Thor Bjorgvinsson 
Judge Bratza wrote a concurring opinion only to say that  while he agrees with the 
decision of the Grand Cham ber he prefers the reasoning of the Cham ber (Burden 
2008, para O- I1) . Though he does not  elaborate on why that  is, it  is perhaps not  
surprising as he was a m em ber of the Cham ber’s m aj orit y in this decision, sit t ing in 
both cases as the UK’s judge on the Court .  
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Judge David Thor Bjorgvinsson also preferred different  reasoning to the majorit y of 
the Grand Cham ber, which was closer to that  of the Cham ber. However, unlike the 
Cham ber he does not  gloss over the issue of whether the sisters’ relat ionship was 
analogous to spouses or civil partners. He rejects the reasoning of the m ajorit y in 
the Grand Cham ber, which is ‘to a large extent  based on reference to the specific 
legal fram ework’ of m arriage/ civil partnership that  the sisters are prevented from  
accessing (Burden 2008,  para O- I I4) . Because sisters cannot  m arry or get  civilly 
partnered, the com parison between them  and spouses or civil partners should be 
m ade based only on the ‘substant ive or m ater ial differences in the nature of the 
relat ionship as such’ and not  with references to the different  legal fram eworks 
available to spouses/ civil partners and siblings (Burden 2008,  para O- I I 5) .  I n term s 
of these m aterial differences, he finds that :  
Despite im portant  differences, m ainly as concerns the sexual nature of the 
relat ionship between m arried couples and civil partner couples, when it  comes to 
the decision to live together, closeness of the personal at tachm ent  and for m ost  
pract ical purposes of daily life and financial m at ters, the relat ionship between the 
applicants in this case has, in general and for the alleged purposes of the relevant  
inheritance tax exem pt ions in part icular, more in com m on with the relat ionship 
between m arr ied or civil partner couples, than t here are differences between 
them …. (Burden 2008, para O- I I 5) .  
As such, he finds that  these sisters are in fact  in a relat ionship analogous to 
spouses/ civil partners. However, he goes on to agree with the reasoning of the 
Cham ber in finding that  the difference in t reatm ent  is object ively and reasonably 
j ust ified. He addit ionally notes, in an indicat ion of his likely view on a sam e-sex 
m arriage case under Art icle 12, that  every step taken to extend the r ights of 
m arriage, though posit ive ‘as it  m ay seem  to be’ from  an equal rights point  of view, 
potent ially has consequences ‘for the social st ructure of society, as well as legal 
consequences’ in the respect ive count ries:  
I t  is precisely for this reason that  it  is not  the role of this Court  to take the init iat ive 
in this m at ter and im pose upon the Mem ber States a duty further to extend the 
applicabilit y of these rules with no clear view of the consequences it  m ay have in 
the different  Mem ber States (Burden 2008, para O- I I 7) .  
I nstead, he concludes, t his m ust  be within the m argin of appreciat ion for individual 
States to determ ine. 
2.5. Dissent ing judgm ents of Judge Zupancic and Judge Borrego Borrego 
Judge Zupancic dissents because he finds the reasoning of the m ajorit y to be 
‘logically inconsistent ’ (Burden 2008, para O- I I I 1) . The issue in the case is 
discrim inat ion concerning the inheritance tax exem pt ion. He first  notes that  
discrim inat ion in it self is not  unlawful and is a necessary part  of decision-m aking. I t  
is only when that  discrim inat ion is on the basis of a ‘suspect  class’ enum erated in 
Art icle 14 that  it  is ‘in principle proscribed’ (Burden 2008, para O- I I I 5)  and these 
suspect  classes enjoy different  levels of scrut iny. Som e categories, such as race or 
nat ional origin, call for  ‘the st r ictest  scrut iny test ’ that  requires a decision to be 
‘suitably tailored to serve a com pelling state interest ’ (Burden 2008, para O- I I I 7)  
while gender, for exam ple, requires an interm ediate test  that  the decision m ust  be 
‘substant ially related to a sufficient ly im portant  interest ’ (Burden 2008,  para O-
I I I 7) . The standard of scrut iny in this case, which deals with social and econom ic 
m at ters, is the ‘m ildest  proport ionalit y ( reasonableness)  t est ’, which ‘inquires 
whether the legislat ion at  issue is rat ionally related to a legit im ate governm ent  
interest ’ (Burden 2008,  para O- I I I 8) .  
Despite the m ildness of the scrut iny applied to this case, for Judge Zupancic the 
crucial issue appears to be that  the tax exem pt ion has now been extended beyond 
m arriage to civil partners. While it  was rest r icted to spouses, ‘the cut -off cr iterion is 
clear’ and the Governm ent  ‘m ay reasonably m aintain that  the close relat ionship of a 
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couple provides sufficient  reason for the tax exem pt ion’ (Burden 2008,  para O-
I I I 12) ,  but  once it  is extended to ‘other m odes of associat ion’ [ i.e. sam e-sex 
couples through civil partnership] , the dist inct ion between the m arr ied and the 
unm arried is ‘broken’ and we m ay quest ion whether the denial of the exem pt ion to 
other form s of associat ion is ‘rat ionally related to a legit im ate governm ental 
interest ’ (Burden 2008,  para O- I I I 13) :  
I  ask m yself,  at  this point , why would consanguinit y be any less im portant  than the 
relat ionship between m arr ied and civil partners? Of course, the quality of 
consanguinit y is different  from  sexual relat ionships but  this has no inherent  bearing 
on the proxim ity of the persons in quest ion…. So what  does the qualitat ive 
difference [ between spouses/ civil partners and siblings]  com e to? I s it  having sex 
with one another that  provides the rat ional relat ionship to a legit im ate governm ent  
interest? (Burden 2008, para O- I I I 16) .  
He therefore concludes, referencing Stec v. United Kingdom  (2006, para 53) , that  
the state is not  required to create ext ra-m arital tax exem pt ions [ for civil partners] ,  
but  once it  does, it  should ‘em ploy at  least  a m inimum  level of reasonableness 
while deciding not  to apply the benefit  to other groups of people in relat ionships of 
sim ilar or closer proxim ity’ (Burden 2008, para O- I I I 19) . The decision to exclude 
relat ionships of consanguinity is in his view ‘sim ply arbit rary’ (Burden 2008,  para O-
I I I 20) .  
Judge Borrego Borrego dissents on the basis that  the m ajorit y j udgm ent  ‘does not  
deal with the problem  raised by this case’ (Burden 2008, para O- IV1) , which he 
fram es as being prim arily about  the quest ion of the m argin of appreciat ion (Burden 
2008, para O- IV6) . He suggests that  the m ajorit y have grounded their j udgm ent  on 
undisputed facts [ i.e. that  the two differences between the sisters and civil partners 
are that  the sisters have a relat ionship of consanguinity and civil partnership is a 
legally binding relat ionship]  and that  this ‘is the best  exam ple there can be of a 
circular, or  I  m ight  even say concent ric, argum ent ’ (Burden 2008,  para OIV8) . 
I nstead, like Judge Zupancic, he relies on the decision in Stec that  a State is not  
required by Art icle 1 of Protocol 1 to give social security benefit s, but  if it  does 
decide to do so, it  m ust  do it  in a m anner that  is com pat ible with Art icle 14. The 
m ajorit y have ‘disregarded’ this Grand Cham ber precedent  in their j udgm ent  
(Burden 2008, para O- I V10)  and have declined to give an answer to the quest ion of 
whether declining to extend the tax exem pt ion to the sisters after they have done 
so for sam e-sex civil partners ‘is a m easure proport ionate to the legit im ate aim  
pursued’ (Burden 2008,  para O- IV9) . He concludes, rather em ot ively, that :  ‘The 
fact  that  the Grand Cham ber did not  give a reply to the applicants, two elderly 
ladies, fills m e with sham e, because they deserved a different  approach’ (Burden 
2008, para O- IV11) . 
3 . Com m entaries and crit iques 
Drawing from  the judgm ents and the exist ing com m entaries and crit iques, the 
issues raised by this case can be fram ed in a num ber of ways, which I  explore in 
this sect ion before suggest ing a fem inist  re- fram ing of the issues at  stake, which 
takes m ore account  of t he broader social and polit ical context  in which this case is 
situated. 
These cases can be read very different ly depending on one’s perspect ive. For the 
claim ants, the cent ral issue is an unfair tax system , which privileges couples 
( though the extension of this to sam e-sex couples in part icular through the Civil 
Partnership Act  2004 appeared to be the im petus for  this case)  whilst  penalising 
cohabit ing and m utually dependent  siblings who cannot  claim  the sam e tax 
exem pt ions despite arguably sim ilar circum stances to spouses, other than the 
sexual nature of the relat ionship. I nterest ingly the language used by the sisters is 
sim ilar to that  of advocates for sam e-sex m arriage:  
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We are looked down upon for being single. We just  want  to be t reated as equal 
cit izens and given the r ights we deserve (Sybil Burden, interviewed in Bale 2006, p. 
11) . 
“We just  want  to be t reated the sam e as lesbians and hom osexuals”  says Sybil. “ I f 
we pay the sam e taxes, then we should have the sam e r ights,”  adds Joy. (Sybil and 
Joyce Burden, interviewed in Robert  Hardm an 2006, p. 36) . 
For others, the fact s of the case are read in the context  of their m irroring a 
‘hypothet ical’ scenario used to t ry to derail the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill 
in 2004 and thereby to seek to underm ine the recognit ion of sam e-sex 
relat ionships, known as the ‘spinster sisters’ wrecking am endm ent , proposed by 
Baroness O’Cathain and Lord Tebbit  ( for further details on this see Barker 2014, 
2015) . As a result , the focus for these com m entators is on praising the resistance 
of this hom ophobic agenda and the extension of the ‘special status’ of m arriage to 
civil partnerships (see for exam ple, European Hum an Rights Law Review 2008, p. 
560) . However, as som e com m entators noted, the extension of the inheritance tax 
exem pt ion to sam e-sex couples through the Civil Partnership Act  seem ed to be a 
dist ract ion in Burden case ( see for  exam ple Baker 2008, p. 331) , which was not  
really about  civil partnerships at  all:  ‘I t  was a case about  tax;  about  spousal 
privilege (and the extension of that  privilege to gays and lesbians who register their 
partnerships) ;  and about  old age and vulnerabilit y’ (Auchm uty 2009, p. 211) .  I t  is 
these them es that  I  pick up in m y judgm ent . 
While the com m entaries generally reveal a certain am ount  of sym pathy for the 
sisters, and som e crit icism  of the Courts’ reasoning in both cases, few argue that  
the ult im ate finding of no violat ion in this case was incorrect . For exam ple, Brian 
Sloan argued following the Cham ber decision, that :  ‘This decision is as deferent ial 
as it s result  is t ragic’ (Sloan 2007, p. 114)  He suggests that  the inheritance tax 
system  should be reform ed to accom m odate the situat ion of the Burden sisters, 
with a system  oriented towards ‘actual econom ic interdependence’ rather than 
form al relat ionship status able to produce fairer results, though this is ‘likely to be 
considered unworkable in a system  so dependent  on categorisat ion’ (Sloan 2007, p. 
116, em phasis in original) . However, he agrees with the Cham ber’s decision not  to 
find the Civil Partnership Act ’s exclusion of siblings to be in violat ion of Art icle 14 
and that  extension of civil partnerships to siblings would have underm ined the 
purpose of the 2004 Act . I nstead, reform  should, he suggests, ‘be lim ited to the tax 
system ’ (Sloan 2007, p. 117) . Sim ilarly, the short  com m entary of the Cham ber 
decision in the European Hum an Rights Law Review is sym pathet ic to the dissent ing 
judgm ent  of Judges Bonello and Garlicki in it s dissat isfact ion with the Court ’s ‘over-
reliance on the m argin of appreciat ion as just ificat ion for the t reatm ent  of the 
applicants’ (European Hum an Rights Law Review  2007, p. 202)  and suggests that  
Parliam ent  should address the situat ion that  the Burden sisters found them selves in 
through separate legislat ion to the Civil Partnership Act . 
The reasoning of the Grand Cham ber fared even less well than that  of the 
Cham ber. Several com m entators, including m yself, found the rat ionale that  sisters 
could not  be analogous to spouses/ civil partners because they are prohibited from  
entering a m arriage/ civil partnership by virtue of being sisters t o be circular and 
unconvincing (see Baker 2008, p. 332, Sloan 2007, p. 485, Gross 2013, p. 278, 
Barker 2014, p. 66) .  The quest ion of whether or not  the sisters’ relat ionship was 
sufficient ly analogous to a spousal relat ionship should have been established based 
on the nature of their relat ionship, rather than the fact  that  they were excluded 
from  spousal status. This type of reasoning, I  would suggest , is indicat ive of a m ore 
general crit icism  of the European Court  of Hum an Rights:  that  it  is far t oo 
deferent ial to what  it  describes as the ‘special status’ of m arriage. This is another 
them e that  I  pick up in m y alternat ive judgm ent . 
One com m entator who argued that  there should have been a violat ion found in this 
case is Aeyal Gross (2013) , in the course of his alternat ive judgm ent  in the case. 
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Though he draws on the work of a num ber of fem inist  scholars, he com es to this 
conclusion on the basis of a m ore liberal view that  the Court  should enforce respect  
for  the diversity of relat ionship types ( including those of single people as well as 
those in non-conjugal and polyam orous relat ionships)  and dism isses concern 
expressed by som e fem inists (such as Graycar and Millbank 2007, see also Barker 
2014)  of the ‘hij acking’ of a potent ially progressive recognit ion of non-conjugal 
relat ionships by conservat ives for their own purposes:  
The fact  that  conservat ive forces m ay want  the sam e for their  own reasons does 
not  change m y posit ion that  extending r ights to various form s of relat ionships, and 
not  discr im inat ing against  single persons, is a worthwhile project  from  the 
perspect ive of equalit y and diversit y (Gross 2013, p. 287-288) . 
Gross appears to prefer a funct ional approach, and the basis of his alternat ive 
judgm ent  is that  the sisters’ relat ionship was funct ionally sim ilar to that  of 
spouses/ civil partners, but  he is not  part icularly t ied to this as his priorit y is the 
recognit ion of non-conjugal relat ionships:  if the State could achieve this through 
expanding opt - in relat ionship recognit ion, effect ively to any two people, this would 
appear t o be an equally acceptable rem edy for him  in this case. Alternat ively, the 
third opt ion offered to the UK in his j udgm ent  is to rem edy the discr im inat ion by 
abolishing inheritance tax exem pt ions altogether. Each of these potent ial solut ions 
would have radically different  im plicat ions for UK taxat ion policy, and it  m ay well be 
appropriate for the St rasbourg court  to leave the quest ion of which to choose to the 
UK governm ent . However, Gross m akes the finding of discrim inat ion in this case 
based only on the funct ional sim ilarit ies between the Burden sisters and 
spouses/ civil partners. The next  stage of the Art icle 14 test  is whether the 
discrim inat ion between those who are sim ilarly situated can be object ively j ust ified, 
( including whether it  is within the UK’s m argin of appreciat ion) . These issues are 
not  considered in his j udgm ent  and the result  is that  it  does not  part icularly 
challenge the not ion of the special status of m arriage any m ore than the Cham ber 
or Grand Cham ber did. I t  sim ply requires m ore (potent ially an infinite num ber of)  
people to have access to it . 
I n cont rast , Rosem ary Auchm uty (2009)  provides a fem inist  reading of the case, 
put t ing it  in the context  not  only of the taxat ion of the sisters’ relat ive wealth and 
the privileging of spouses at  the expense of everyone else, but  also old age and 
vulnerabilit y. Not ing that  ‘single wom en and old people … have a long history of 
being overlooked and disregarded in the handing out  of privileges’, Auchm uty 
suggests that  the way to resolve this case is, ‘not  to extend the definit ion of 
couples eligible to form  a civil partnership, nor t o abolish inheritance tax, but  to get  
r id of the spousal exem pt ion ’ (Auchm uty 2009, p. 216, em phasis in original) . I  
would suggest  that  it  is Auchm uty’s fem inist  approach that  led her in a different  
direct ion to the other com m entators, who for the m ost  part  cam e to the opposite 
conclusion:  that  the exem pt ion should be extended in som e way but  not  through 
allowing siblings access to civil partnerships. Sharing this approach, I  have com e to 
a sim ilar conclusion based not  only a different  reading of the relevant  ECHR 
provisions, which I  set  out  in m y judgm ent , but  also a different  reading of the fact s 
of this case and through taking into account  the broader social, econom ic and 
polit ical context  in which the inheritance tax rules operate. I  out line this below, 
along side a considerat ion of the argum ents relat ing to conjugalit y and care, which 
have been m ade by several fem inists as well as the com m entators on this case. 
4 . A fem inist  refram ing of Burden 
4.1. Re- fram ing the fact s of the case 
From  a fem inist  perspect ive I  would agree that  it  is difficult  to j ust ify privileging 
sexual relat ionships, part icularly through tax exem pt ions, but  I  would not  suggest  
that  this therefore m eans that  siblings ought  to be sim ilarly privileged in the tax 
system . The sisters appear to claim  that  they have been disadvantaged by the 
Nicola Barker Rethinking Conjugality as the Basis for  Fam ily Recognit ion 
 
Oñat i Socio- legal Ser ies, v. 6, n. 6 (2016) , 1249-1275 
I SSN:  2079-5971 1262 
increase in value of their hom e, which they had built  on land inherited from  their 
parents in 1965 at  a cost  of £7000. During the subsequent  40 years, the hom e and 
it s 30 acres of farm land had increased in value to £550,000. I t  is noteworthy, 
though absent  from  both judgm ents, that  each sister’s share of the hom e would be 
below the inheritance tax threshold of £300,000 ( in the tax year 2007/ 8 when the 
Grand Cham ber case was heard, now increased)  but  for the fact  that  they also own 
other property so their total propert y holdings are worth £875,000 in addit ion to 
another £300,000 in investm ents and other assets. These sisters seem  to be 
privileged enough already without  addit ional tax advantages, part icularly com pared 
to the st ruggles faced by the younger generat ion who are widely reported to be 
giving up on the idea of hom e ownership as a result  part ly of the type of house 
price inflat ion that  the Burden sisters have experienced and a result ing shortage of 
affordable housing. 4 
I  would also quest ion their assert ion that  they would be com pelled to sell their 
hom e to pay the tax bill,  m ade hesitant ly in the judgm ents ( ‘m ight  have to’) , but  
m ore definit ively in the m edia reports of the case ( see for  exam ple Bale 2006 and 
Hardm an 2006) . On the basis of the assets listed in the Cham ber judgm ent , the 
hom e and surrounding land is worth £875,000 at  the t im e of the hearing, with each 
sister owning an addit ional port folio of investm ents and other property worth 
£150,000, taking the total value of each sister ’s estate to £587,500. The first  
£300,000 at  that  t im e (since increased to £325,000)  would not  be liable for  
inheritance tax, so the tax bill would be 40%  of £287,500, or £115,000. 5 This could 
be easily paid by selling the deceased sister’s addit ional port folio of investm ents 
and property with £35,000 to spare. 
The Burden case was fram ed in the Court  and the m edia as being about  a 
vulnerable pensioner who m ay lose her hom e when her sister dies. As a result  it  
could be easy to lose sight  of both the fact  that  these part icular pensioners are very 
wealthy and in general the pat tern of poverty in the UK has changed dram at ically 
over the last  twenty years, when ‘pensioner poverty has fallen sharply, while child 
poverty has fallen slowly and unevenly and working-age poverty has r isen, 
part icularly in the last  decade’ (MacInnes et  al 2014, p. 28) .  I t  is not  horizontal 
t ransm ission of wealth between siblings that  should be the prim ary concern of tax 
policy but  rather addressing poverty, which at  the m om ent  is stat ist ically m uch 
m ore likely to im pact  the younger generat ion, with 34%  of 16-19 year olds and 
29%  of 20-24 year olds in poverty in the UK, a 6 point  increase from  a decade 
earlier (MacInnes et  al 2014, p. 28) . I t  is not  at  all clear how this would be 
addressed by reducing or elim inat ing inheritance tax for the wealthiest  few estates 
in recognit ion of care that  has been provided, even where that  care is inter-
generat ional and at  the expense of the carer ’s paid em ploym ent  rather than the 
m ore m utual support  and interdependence of the Burden sisters case. 
4.2. The broader context :  tax and welfare in the age of austerit y 
We m ight  also com pare the surviving sister’s dilem m a of choosing between 
downsizing from  a four-bedroom  hom e to a sm aller property or  selling som e of her 
other investm ents to pay the tax bill,  to that  of the poorest  people in the UK who 
receive housing benefit  and have recent ly had their benefit s cut  as part  of the 
notorious ‘bedroom  tax’, or under-occupancy penalty, which was int roduced in April 
                                                 
4
 See for example:  I nman (2015) . The r ise of campaign group Generat ion Rent , which ‘campaigns for 
professionally managed, secure, decent  and affordable pr ivate rented homes in sustainable communit ies’ 
is also indicat ive of the shift  from  home ownership to pr ivate rent ing:  < www.generat ionrent .org>  
[ accessed 14 Apr il 2015] . 
5
 There is some disagreement between commentators on the exact  f igure, possibly due to conflict ing 
reports of the sisters’ assets. For example, Dempsey (2009, p. 35)  also est imates the tax liability at  
£115,000, whilst  Auchmuty (2009, p. 212)  calculates it  at  £191,000. The lat ter  f igure would also require 
the surviv ing sister to sell some of her investments but  she could st ill comfortably meet  the tax bill 
without  it  being necessary to sell the home, contrary to the media reports of the case. 
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2013 (Housing Benefit  (Am endm ent )  Regulat ions 2012) . Under these regulat ions, 
housing benefit  has been reduced by 14%  for those who are deem ed to have a 
‘spare’ bedroom  in their hom e, or by 25%  for t hose who are deem ed to have two or 
m ore spare bedroom s, despite a shortage of affordable sm aller one-bedroom  
propert ies for people to t ransfer into. The tenants, oft en already living in povert y,  
then need to pay the addit ional cost , usually to a private landlord due to the 
shortage of public housing. The bedroom  tax does not  apply to those who are over 
65 years old and there are exem pt ions for people with certain disabilit ies who 
require a room  for overnight  carers but  there are m ult iple reports of disabled 
people having to pay this tax and not  receiving help with it , despite local authorit ies 
being given a fund to m ake ‘discret ionary housing paym ents’ to cover the difference 
in such cases. 6 
As noted in the judgm ent  of one of the bedroom  tax cases, ‘The Coalit ion 
Governm ent  cam e to power in 2010 with a m andate to reduce the budget  deficit . I t  
has int roduced a radical welfare reform  schem e which is designed to cont rol the 
cost  of the social security budget ’. (R (on the applicat ion of MA and Others)  v. 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 2014, para 17)  However, t he ‘m andate’ 
( such as it  existed for  a coalit ion governm ent  rather than out r ight  m ajorit y)  to 
reduce the budget  deficit , and the policy of encouraging people living in hom es 
larger than they need to downsize during this housing crisis, appear t o extend only 
to those below ret irem ent  age and claim ing state welfare. The elderly and the 
( relat ively)  wealthy have had their exist ing privileges and tax regim es largely 
protected. As such, in cont rast  to the bedroom  tax policy, and despite only the 
wealthiest  4.8%  of estates being liable to pay any inheritance tax at  all in 2013-14 
(Office for Budget  Responsibilit y 2014) , the recent ly elected Conservat ive 
governm ent  have pledged to raise the exem pt ion to £1 m illion, including an 
exem pt ion for the fam ily hom e (Conservat ives 2015, p. 67) , at  the sam e t im e as 
decim at ing the welfare state, with a further £12 billion of cuts proposed after  the 
pensioners’ benefit s, which com prise m ore than half of the total welfare spending, 
have been protected (Stewart  et  al. 2015) . This m eans that  these cuts m ust  once 
again com e from  working-age benefits, which have already been hard-hit  by 
austerit y m easures such as the benefit  cap and bedroom  tax, which were 
int roduced during the last  Parliam ent . The Conservat ives also pledged to further 
reduce the benefit  cap for working-age fam ilies from  £26,000 to £23,000 ‘within 
the first  few days’ of a Conservat ive governm ent  (Saul 2015) . I t  is indicat ive that  
the Conservat ive m anifesto refers t o welfare as ‘wasteful spending’ in the sam e 
group as tax evasion and avoidance (Saul 2015, p. 9)  and ident ifies the causes of 
child poverty as:  ‘ent renched worklessness, fam ily breakdown, problem  debt , and 
drug and alcohol dependency’ (Saul 2015, p. 28) , rather than factors such as a 
m inimum  wage that  is below the living wage, excessively high rents in the private 
rental sector com bined with a scarcity of public housing, and insecure work. 7 
I nheritance tax is deeply unpopular, seen by som e as a ‘double taxat ion’ since 
incom e and assets have already been taxed when they were init ially received and 
as standing in the way of parents passing on the fam ily assets to their children (see 
for  exam ple Thom son 2008) . But  I  would suggest  that  with the UK’s increasing gap 
between the r ich and the rest  it  is a good exam ple of wealth redist r ibut ion through 
taxat ion that  should be extended and properly enforced rather than ret racted. 
Although inheritance tax receipts were significant ly less than incom e tax receipts at  
£3.1 billion and £152 billion respect ively in 2012-13 (Mat thews 2014) , increasing 
                                                 
6
 Cases where the bedroom tax has been challenged by people with disabilit ies include:  Burnip v. 
Birm ingham City Council and Secretary of State for  Work and Pensions, et  al. (2012) , R (on the 
applicat ion of MA and Others)  v. Secretary of State for  Work and Pensions (2014) , and Rutherford v. 
Secretary of State for  Work and Pensions and Pembrokeshire County Council (2014) . 
7
 A recent  report  by the Joseph Rowntree Foundat ion (2014)  found that  as many people liv ing in poverty 
are in working fam ilies as are in fam ilies where no one works, and that  there has been a vast  increase in 
insecure work over the last  ten years, ‘which means that  get t ing a job does not  necessar ily mean get t ing 
out  of poverty. 
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the liabilit y over the nil rate threshold to 100%  would not  only go a long way 
towards disrupt ing the t ransm ission of wealth within fam ilies at  the expense of the 
rest  of the populat ion but  also, as pointed out  in a Forbes Magazine art icle ‘take 
m oney from  the deceased and use it  to supplem ent  taxes paid by the living’. 8 
Another alternat ive is that  inheritance should be taxed in the sam e way as ordinary 
incom e, with no exem pt ions, so that  ‘all incom e, earned and unearned, from  capital 
gain or sweat  of brow, is taxed the sam e, whatever it s source’ (Toynbee 2014) . 
This is an at t ract ive proposit ion as it  takes into account  the situat ion of the 
recipient  rather than the deceased because the tax paid is based on their total 
incom e (see Adam  and Em m erson 2014) . Therefore, the surviving Burden sister ’s 
tax liabilit y would be in proport ion to her annual incom e once the inheritance is 
taken into account . I f her only incom e is a state pension she would pay significant ly 
less tax than if she also has a private incom e through her addit ional assets. 
Nevertheless, even under the exist ing inheritance tax regim e, in this econom ic and 
social policy context  it  is difficult  to have sym pathy for the Burden sisters, whose 
total wealth places them  in the top 4.8%  of estates, which are eligible for  
inheritance tax. 
4.3. Conjugalit y and care 
Despite this context , the quest ion rem ains of whether there m ight  nevertheless be 
reason to recognize interdependence between non-spouses, part icularly as a way of 
addressing vulnerabilit y within both the elderly populat ion and their carers. 9 With 
an aging populat ion needing care, and this care increasingly provided within the 
fam ily or fr iendship network, is it  really j ust ifiable to cont inue to lim it  legal and 
econom ic privileges of m arriage to spouses and civil partners? In other words, 
should the inheritance tax exem pt ion rem ain, but  based on dem onst rat ing a 
relat ionship of care and dependency, rather than a spousal relat ionship? Som e 
fam ily lawyers have m ade argum ents along these lines, though m ore broadly than 
just  in relat ion to the inheritance tax claim  at  issue in this case. 
Martha Finem an (1995, 2004)  argues that  the whole system  of spousal privileges 
ought  to be reoriented away from  the sexual relat ionship between adults and 
towards the caretaker-dependent  relat ionship. The prim e exam ple of this 
relat ionship is m other-child (using m othering as a synonym  for care that  can also 
include m en who are prim ary carers)  but  it  could also apply to som eone looking 
after a disabled or elderly person. She notes that  dependency is an inevitable fact  
of life and that  those who perform  the caretaking role them selves begin to suffer 
from  derivat ive dependency because they in turn becom e dependent  on support ,  
whether financial because they are now unable to engage in paid labour, or 
otherwise. Hiding this derivat ive dependency within the m arital fam ily and sift ing 
state resources and privileges through the sexual relat ionship of m arr iage instead 
of direct ly to the caretaking relat ionship that  really requires these resources and 
privileges has served to st igm at ise those who find them selves dependent  on the 
state because they are engaged in caretaking labour outside of the m arital fam ily 
( i.e. single m others)  and is not  the m ost  effect ive way to dist r ibute resources. As 
such, Finem an (1995)  argues that  m arriage should be abolished and instead the 
state should focus it s at tent ion on encouraging and support ing these caretaking 
relat ionships. 
Jonathan Herring (2014)  draws on Finem an’s work am ongst  others in m aking his 
argum ent  that  fam ily law in the UK should be m ore focused on care, rather than 
sex. He argues that  for  each of the three funct ions of fam ily law (as ident ified by 
John Eekelaar [ 1984] :  nam ely protect ive, adjust ive, and support ive) , the existence 
of a sexual relat ionship is irrelevant . I nstead a caring relat ionship is what  creates 
                                                 
8
 Though it  should be noted that  the art icle does go on to disagree with such a policy (Mat thews 2014) . 
9
 For example, one of the ways in which people seek to avoid inher itance tax, by t ransferr ing assets to 
fam ily while they are alive, can increase the vulnerability of elder ly people. 
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the vulnerabilit y that  the law ought  to address. Taking for exam ple the protect ive 
funct ion, Herring argues that  abuse of the elderly dem onst rates that  it  is ‘the 
int im acy of the relat ionship, not  it s sexual nature, which is key to the wrong in 
dom est ic violence’ (Herring 2014, p. 53) . For this reason it  is correct  to focus 
dom est ic violence protect ions on int im ate relat ionships rather than sexual ones. 
Sim ilarly, fam ily law at tem pts to protect  vulnerable fam ily m em bers from  financial 
exploitat ion. While the law typically only concerns it self with financial orders on 
divorce, Herring argues that  while sexual relat ionships in them selves do not  cause 
financial loss ( i.e. where there is no parent ing or care work within the relat ionship)  
‘care work is closely t ied to financial inequalit y’ (Herring 2014, p. 53) . I t  is those 
who have taken prim ary responsibilit y for childcare who tend to suffer financial 
disadvantage. Sim ilarly, in relat ion to the adjust ive funct ion of fam ily law, he notes 
that  it  is necessary to m ake arrangem ents for children at  the end of the relat ionship 
whether or not  there was a sexual relat ionship between the part ies. Finally, he 
argues that  sex is not  necessarily a good indicator of com m itm ent  or  int im acy, so 
he quest ions whether sexual relat ionships are of such significance that  they deserve 
the support ive funct ion of fam ily law. I n cont rast , caring relat ionships do benefit  
the state, part icularly where the care would otherwise have to be provided by the 
state and as such it  is caring relat ionships that  should receive the support  of the 
state (Herring 2014, p. 55) . 
Moving away from  privileging sexual relat ionships through the m arriage m odel is an 
at t ract ive proposit ion, but  m y concern about  both of these approaches is that  by 
recognizing and privileging care, there becom es an expectat ion that  care will be 
provided within the fam ily and a result ing withdrawal of state services ( see also 
Boyd 1997, p. 14, 1999, p. 377) . There is also the im portant  quest ion of what  
happens when the recipient  of care does not  have the resources to adequately 
com pensate the carer’s financial disadvantage through propert y redist r ibut ion. I t  
seem s they would be in the sam e posit ion as m any wives find them selves on 
divorce:  having to rely on state welfare and st igm at ized as a result . While collect ive 
responsibilit y for care is hidden behind incent ives for privat ized responsibilit y, these 
rewards for care in the form  of legal recognit ion and privileges render both the 
carer and the cared for vulnerable to changing fam ily circum stances, even in 
fam ilies that  init ially did have sufficient  resources. I t  should also not  be assum ed 
that  legal recognit ion will result  in financial benefits for  all those in caretaking 
relat ionships:  as Claire Young (2015, p. 134)  has found in relat ion to the 
recognit ion of sam e-sex couples in Canada’s tax laws, while som e benefited from  
inclusion others, usually those least  able to afford the addit ional cost , have actually 
acquired an increased tax burden. 
I t  appears to serve the interests of the privat izing, neo- liberal state to expand legal 
recognit ion and privilege to carers. For exam ple, focusing specifically on the issue 
of tax rather than the broader fam ily law argum ents m ade by Finem an and Herring, 
Claire Young argues that  by recognizing spouses and com m on law partners in the 
Canadian tax system , the tax system  plays an im portant  role in the privat izat ion of 
care, whether this care is actual care-giving or the econom ic support  of fam ily 
m em bers (Young 2006, p. 22) . She dem onst rates the ways in which m any of these 
tax breaks, including those focused on dependency, are ‘inequitable and 
discrim inate without  good reason against  those couples with low incom es and in 
favour of those with high incom es’, as arguably would be the case with the 
expansion of the inheritance tax exem pt ion sought  by the Burden sisters, in 
addit ion to being poorly targeted and part  of the neo- liberal privat izat ion agenda 
(Young 2006, p. 17) . Reliance on privat ized responsibilit y is problem at ic because:  
At  a general level such privat izat ion policies tend to dim inish the role that  the state 
plays in ensuring a fair  level of incom e for all it s cit izens. The state is delegat ing its 
responsibilit y to the private sector, with vir tually no st r ings at tached. Encouraging 
the private fam ily to fill the role previously taken by the state leaves gaps in the 
social securit y network, gaps which those without  spouses or com m on law partners 
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often fall through. The result  is often a ret irem ent  lived in poverty (Young 2006, p. 
24) . 
Of course, as Herring (2014, p. 58)  notes in response to m y crit ique of reorient ing 
legal recognit ion towards care (Barker 2014) , t he neoliberal state m ay nevertheless 
privat ize responsibilit y without  giving carers any resources such as tax breaks. 
However, a system  of recognit ion legit im izes the rolling back of state support , 
providing a narrat ive that  can be used to j ust ify it  and st igm at ise those who cannot  
provide or financially support  privat ized care within the fam ily in the sam e way, as 
Finem an notes, that  single m others have been subjected to this. The ring fencing of 
the very large proport ion of the state welfare budget  dedicated to pensioner 
benefit s (even though they are m ost ly not  m eans- tested, such as the winter fuel 
allowance and concessionary t ravel)  in t im es of austerit y and deep cuts elsewhere 
dem onst rates how difficult  it  is for  governm ents to m ake cuts that  im pact  on this 
group of act ive voters. However, not  all of those receiving care are in this group 
and their carers, who need the financial support  of the state, will often not  be 
either. I f cuts are m ade to vital pensioner benefit s related to care, such as carers’ 
allowance, it  is poorer pensioners and their carers who will find them selves 
financially disadvantaged, while those such as the Burden sisters benefit  from  the 
tax breaks of a privat ized regim e. 10 
On the basis of her analysis of the Canadian tax system , Claire Young argues in 
favour of enact ing the recom m endat ions of the Law Com m ission of Canada (LCC)  
(2001)  and ‘consider repealing m any of the tax rules that  take spousal status into 
account ’ (Young 2006, p. 29) . The Burden case also serves to illust rate why the 
Law Com m ission of Canada m ethodology seem s sensible in the UK context  as well 
and as such this is the approach I  will take in m y alternat ive judgm ent . The LCC 
rej ected any relat ionship-based approach to legal privileges as far as possible, 
focussing instead on the object ive of the individual provision. This means that  in 
the case of the Burden sisters, the quest ion is not  about  how deserving or 
otherwise the sisters are of recognit ion but  rather about  what  the obj ect ive of the 
inheritance tax exem pt ion is and whether t he sisters’ relat ionship fulfils that  
object ive-based criterion. The LCC m ethodology to be applied to each law involves 
asking the following four quest ions:  
First , are the object ives of the law st ill legit im ate? I f the object ives of the law are 
no longer appropriate, the response m ay be to repeal or fundam entally revise a law 
rather than to adjust  it s use of relat ional term s. Second, if a law is pursuing a 
legit im ate object ive, are relat ionships relevant  to the object ive at  hand? I f 
relat ionships are not  important , then the legislat ion should be redesigned to 
allocate the r ights and responsibilit ies on an individual basis. Third, assum ing that  
relat ionships are relevant , could the law allow individuals to decide which of their 
close personal relat ionships should be subject  to the law? Fourth, if relat ionships do 
m at ter, and self-definit ion of relevant  relat ionships is not  a feasible opt ion, is there 
a bet ter way for the governm ent  to include relat ionships? (Law Com m ission of 
Canada 2001, p. 29-30) . 
I t  is at  the first  quest ion that  in m y view the spousal inheritance tax exem pt ion 
fails, due to m any of the issues raised in this sect ion. I n applying this fem inist  
perspect ive and refram ing of the facts of the case in m y alternat ive judgm ent  I  
seek to dem onst rate how this conclusion can be reached based on a different  
interpretat ion of the provisions of the Convent ion, specifically the prohibit ion of 
m arital status discrim inat ion under Art icle 14. There is plenty of scope for a 
fem inist  j udge to m ake the point  that  the privileging of m arriage under the 
Convent ion has m eant  that  the principles of non-discrim inat ion have been rendered 
ent irely m eaningless in the context  of unjust ified preferent ial t reatm ent  for spouses 
in nat ional law. Redressing this does not  m ean sim ply expanding the categories of 
relat ionship to receive such privileged status but  rather considering, as the LCC 
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 See also Claire Young’s (2015, p. 146)  cr it ique of expanding spousal tax breaks in Canada for sim ilar 
reasons, i.e. that  such measures tend to benefit  those on higher incomes  
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suggests, the legit im acy of the object ives of each law and thereby dism ant ling the 
‘package’ of legal privileges associated with marriage where there is no legit im ate 
object ive to the preferent ial t reatm ent .  
5 . Fem inist  judgm ent  
Burden v. United Kingdom . Applicat ion No. 13378/ 05 Before the European Court  of 
Hum an Rights, Grand Cham ber 1 May 2015 
5.1. Part ly dissent ing and part ly concurring opinion of Judge Barker 
O-V1 The applicants’ claim  is that  their exclusion from  the spousal inheritance tax 
exem pt ion under the I nheritance Tax Act  1984, s18(1) , const itutes a violat ion of 
Art icle 14 in conjunct ion with Art icle 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) . The m ajor it y j udgm ent  
explains why the com plaint  falls within the am bit  of A1P1 and I  concur with that  
analysis. My dissent  is in relat ion to their applicat ion of Art icle 14, though m y 
ult im ate conclusion on the fact s of this case concurs with the m ajorit y. 
Art icle 14 provides that :  
The enjoym ent  of the r ights and freedom s set  forth in this Convent ion shall be 
secured without  discr im inat ion on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, polit ical or other opinion, nat ional or social or igin, associat ion with a 
nat ional m inorit y, property, bir th or other status. 
I t  is well established that  ‘other status’ covers a range of personal characterist ics, 
including m arital status. (Sahin v. Germ any  2003)  
O-V2 As the m ajorit y correct ly note, not  every difference in t reatm ent  will 
const itute a violat ion of Art icle 14. The difference in t reatm ent  m ust  first  of all be 
between those who are in relevant ly sim ilar situat ions. (DH v. Czech Republic 2008, 
para 175)  I t  is at  this point  that  the m ajorit y consider the applicants to have failed 
because they can be dist inguished from  spouses/ civil partners on the basis that  ‘the 
very essence of the connect ion between siblings is consanguinity, whereas one of 
the defining characterist ics of a m arriage [ or civil partnership]  is that  it  is forbidden 
to close fam ily m em bers’ (Burden v. United Kingdom  2008, para 62) . Furtherm ore, 
they find that  m arriage confers a special status, which gives r ise to social, personal 
and legal consequences, and is protected under Art icle 12. Sim ilarly, the ‘legal 
consequences of civil partnership… which couples expressly and deliberately decide 
to incur, set  these types of relat ionship apart  from  other form s of cohabitat ion’ 
(Burden v. United Kingdom  2008, para 65) . As such, it  is not  the length and nature 
of the relat ionship that  is determ inat ive but  rather the absence of a legally binding 
agreem ent  between the applicants renders it  ‘fundam entally different ’ to that  of 
spouses or civil partners (Burden v. United Kingdom  2008, para 65) .  
O-V3 In m y view the m ajorit y have erred in their analysis on this point  and have 
been led in that  direct ion by erroneous case law on the ‘special status’ of m arriage 
in previous decisions in which unm arried couples have been t reated less favourably 
than m arried couples, 11 even when the law prevents them  from  m arry ing. (Gas v. 
France 2014)  I t  is illogical and circular to dist inguish a relat ionship between those 
who are legally prohibited from  m aking the sort  of legally binding public 
undertaking that  spouses and civil partners m ake, on the basis that  they have not  
done so. I ndeed, m aking a dist inct ion on this basis renders the prohibit ion of 
m arital status discrim inat ion under Art icle 14 com pletely ineffect ive in any case that  
seeks to com pare the t reatm ent  of m arried and unm arried couples. 
O-V4 There is, perhaps, an arguable case to be m ade that  in a situat ion where a 
couple have chosen not  to m arry, despite it  being available to them , that  they have 
declined the various protect ions and privileges that  spousal status brings and 
therefore any difference in t reatm ent  could be just ified. However, a recent  
                                                 
11
 For example, Shackell v. United Kingdom  (2000) . 
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j udgm ent  from  the Cham ber (Third Sect ion)  suggests that  even in this situat ion the 
Court ’s pat ience for such discrim inat ion is declining:  
Last ly, the Court  cannot  accept  the Governm ent ’s argum ent  that  it  would have 
been sufficient  for the applicant  to enter into a civil m arr iage in order to obtain the 
pension claim ed. The prohibit ion of discr im inat ion enshrined in Art icle 14 of the 
Convent ion is m eaningful only if, in each part icular case, the applicant ’s personal 
situat ion in relat ion to the cr iter ia listed in that  provision is taken into account  
exact ly as it  stands. To proceed otherwise in dismissing the vict im ’s claim s on the 
ground that  he or she could have avoided the discrim inat ion by altering one of the 
factors in quest ion – for exam ple, by entering into a civil m arr iage – would render 
Art icle 14 devoid of substance. (Munoz Diaz v. Spain 2009, para 70) . 12 
This is also not  the set  of facts under considerat ion in this case and in any event  
this would speak to the second part  of the test , as a quest ion of j ust ificat ion of 
different ial t reatm ent  and proport ionalit y rather than as an indicat ion that  they are 
not  sim ilarly situated to spouses for the purposes of the first  part  of the Art icle 14 
test .  
O-V5 In a situat ion such as this one, where siblings are not  perm it ted to m arry or 
becom e civil partners, or a situat ion where sam e-sex couples are not  perm it ted to 
m arry or becom e civil partners, such as in Gas v. France (2014) , it  is unjust  to 
effect ively punish them  (by not  providing them  access to even the first  stage of 
Art icle 14 protect ion)  for the decision of the State to prevent  them  from  
undertaking a legally-binding agreem ent . This is not  t o suggest  that  the State m ust  
allow any type of relat ionship access to spousal status, nor is it  to suggest  that  they 
cannot  necessarily t reat  spouses different ly to non-spouses, but  these points need 
to be dealt  with in the second and third stages of the Art icle 14 test . Therefore, for  
the first  part  of the Art icle 14 test  we m ust  consider the substant ive aspects of the 
relat ionship, rather than the (absent )  form alit ies. 
O-V6 Perhaps the reason why this Court  has turned to the legal form  in the past  is 
because the characterist ics of spousal relat ionships are so difficult  to determ ine, as 
they can be widely diverse between different  relat ionships. However, som e 
jurisdict ions have recognized unm arried relat ionships for different  purposes and in 
doing so have com piled general lists of characterist ics that  should be m et  in order 
to qualify. For exam ple the Property (Relat ionships)  Act  1984 of New South Wales, 
Aust ralia, seeks evidence of a set  of criteria that  is clearly based on assum pt ions 
about  m arriage, such as:  a long- term , cohabit ing, sexual relat ionship;  financial 
dependence or interdependence;  m utual com m itm ent  to a shared life;  and the 
reputat ion and public aspects of the relat ionship (s4(2) ) . However, none of these 
factors is required except  cohabitat ion and ‘a court  determ ining whether such a 
relat ionship exists is ent it led to have regard to such m at ters, and to at tach such 
weight  to any m at ter, as m ay seem  appropriate to the court  in the circum stances of 
the case’ ( s4(3) ) .  
O-V7 Whilst  this Act  is not  binding on the UK or this Court , it s existence 
dem onst rates that  it  is not  outside the abilit y of this Court  to const ruct  a sim ilar list  
of spousal characterist ics to test  whether a non-m arital relat ionship could be 
relevant ly sim ilar to spouses. I f we com pare the facts of the applicants’ relat ionship 
to this list  as an exam ple, there are few potent ial difficult ies in com ing to the 
conclusion that  they are in fact  sim ilarly situated to spouses/ civil partners. There is 
lit t le doubt  that  they have a long- term , cohabit ing relat ionship, financial 
interdependence, and m utual com m itm ent  to a shared life. They do not  m eet  the 
sexual relat ionship aspect  and the ‘reputat ion and public aspects of the relat ionship’ 
are unlikely to be that  they are in a spousal relat ionship but  the quest ion is what  
                                                 
12
 However, it  should be noted that  this is a case of racial discr im inat ion in the failure to recognize a 
t radit ional Roma marr iage that  had not  been civ illy registered, and it  also differs from the facts of the 
present  case in that  the applicant  had believed herself to be legally marr ied and had been t reated by the 
State as validly marr ied for other purposes. 
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weight  should be at tached to these m at ters in the context  of the inheritance tax 
exem pt ion in quest ion. I s the sexual nature of the relat ionship really the m ost  
im portant  determ ining factor for a tax exem pt ion? I  would suggest  not . Rather, the 
m ost  weight  should be placed on financial interdependence and, given the fam ily 
hom e is claim ed to be at  stake in this case, cohabitat ion. 
O-V8 According to the Governm ent ’s subm ission, the purpose of the tax exem pt ion 
for  spouses is to ‘provide the survivor with a m easure of financial secur ity, and thus 
prom ote m arriage’ [ 50] . Leaving aside the issue of prom ot ing m arriage, which I  
return to later, it  is difficult  to believe that  t his m easure of financial security is 
really due only to those who are in a sexual relat ionship. Financial interdependence 
and sexual relat ions are quite separate issues. Though they are often found in the 
sam e relat ionship, the applicants provide an exam ple of where the form er can exist  
without  the lat ter. I t  is also worth not ing that , while civil partnerships were 
intended to provide a m arriage- like relat ionship for sam e-sex couples and extend 
the tax exem pt ion to them , they do not , technically, require sexual relat ions at  any 
point  during the relat ionship, as there is no m ent ion of consum m at ion in the Civil 
Partnership Act  2004. Sim ilarly, it  is incredibly rare that  a m arriage is nullified for 
non-consum m at ion in the UK;  in fact , non-consum m at ion on it s own is not  a 
ground for nullit y. Rather, there m ust  have been an inabilit y or willful refusal to 
consum m ate on the part  of the respondent  to a pet it ion (Mat rim onial Causes Act  
1973, s.12(a)  and (b) ) . Spouses m ay quite legit im ately agree that  it  is not  to be a 
sexual relat ionship without  invalidat ing their lawful m arriage. On this basis, rather 
less weight  should be at tached to the sexual nature of the relat ionship in any 
circum stances. 
O-V9 I t  is worth not ing that  the applicants are not  seeking access to m arriage or 
civil partnership. They seek only a rem edy to their tax liabilit y, which in their view 
is discrim inatory because others in sim ilar relat ionships are exem pt , nam ely 
spouses and civil partners. Though it  was m ent ioned in their subm ission that  they 
would have entered into a civil partnership had it  been possible, I  hope that  on 
reflect ion the sisters would have realized that  this m arriage- like inst itut ion is not  
suitable for siblings, regardless of the length of their cohabitat ion or t heir financial 
interdependence, due to the legal st ructure imposed on the recognit ion of spousal 
relat ionships that  are not  necessarily relevant  in the taxat ion context . The legal 
inst itut ions of m arriage and civil partnership are designed to recognize an exclusive 
relat ionship between two people, voluntarily entered into, and, although it  is 
intended to be for life, there is a m echanism  for the legal dissolut ion of this 
relat ionship. I t  m ay be that  the applicants would be willing to forgo other potent ial 
spousal relat ionships after they had registered their civil partnership, but  if one 
sister did subsequent ly form  a rom ant ic relat ionship she would have to dem onst rate 
the ‘irret r ievable breakdown’ of her relat ionship with her sister in order to m arry or 
get  a civil partnership with this partner. Sim ilarly, if there had been a third 
surviving Burden sibling who also cohabited with the applicants, or if they were 
brother and sister rather than sisters, they would find them selves excluded once 
again, or in the form er case facing a difficult  decision about  which two siblings 
would enter the civil partnership. The am endm ent  to the Civil Partnership Bill that  
was int roduced in the UK Parliam ent  was m erely a wrecking am endm ent  and would 
not  have been a workable solut ion to the problem  of m arital status discrim inat ion in 
this case. 
O-V10 Marital status discrim inat ion does not  occur as a result  of exclusion from  the 
inst itut ion of m arriage per se. I t  is well within a State’s m argin of appreciat ion to 
set  the term s of who m ay m arry, as acknowledged in the wording of Art icle 12, that  
‘m en and wom en of m arriageable age have the r ight  to m arry and found a fam ily, 
according to the nat ional laws governing the exercise of this r ight ’ (m y em phasis) . 
I t  is instead the legal and econom ic privileging of this spousal relat ionship over and 
above other sim ilarly situated relat ionships for  the purpose of prom ot ing m arriage 
above other fam ily form s that  results in what  is in m y view unlawful m arital status 
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discrim inat ion. As a result , the focus m ust  be on the individual spousal privilege 
and whether or not  t here is a j ust ificat ion for cont inuing with this part icular 
privilege and, if so, cont inuing to exclude sim ilarly situated non-m arital 
relat ionships from  it . I n this, I  am  assisted by the persuasive recom m endat ions of 
the Law Com m ission of Canada’s (2001)  report , Beyond Conjugalit y:  Recognizing 
and Support ing Close Personal Adult  Relat ionships.  
O-V11 Therefore, looking at  the totalit y of the circum stances of the applicants’ lives 
and the fact  that  they m eet  what  are arguably the m ost  significant  indicators of a 
spousal relat ionship in this context  of tax liabilit y ( that  is, long- term  cohabitat ion, 
m utual support  and com m itm ent  to a shared life, and m ost  im portant ly financial 
interdependence) , I  would conclude that  they are sufficient ly sim ilarly situated, in a 
relevant  way according to the context  of t he claim  (being tax- related) , to be 
analogous to spouses or civil partners. 
O-V12 The next  part  of the Art icle 14 test  is whether the difference in t reatm ent  is 
object ively and reasonably j ust ified. I n other words, it  m ust  pursue a legit im ate aim  
and ‘there m ust  be a reasonable relat ionship of proport ionalit y between the m eans 
em ployed and the aim  sought  to be realised’. (Stec v. United Kingdom  2006, para 
51)  While the m ajorit y in this Court  did not  find it  necessary to go on to consider 
this, having already found that  the applicants were not  analogous to spouses, the 
Cham ber did consider this part  of the test . The claim ants failed before the Cham ber 
as it  accepted the UK Governm ent ’s subm ission that  the inheritance tax exem pt ion 
for  spouses and civil partners pursues the legit im ate aim  of prom ot ing stable, 
com m it ted relat ionships:  ‘The State cannot  be crit icized for pursuing, through its 
taxat ion system , policies designed to prom ote m arriage….’ [ 59] .  
O-V13 However, I  would answer the quest ion of whether there is a legit im ate aim  
in the negat ive. The UK Governm ent ’s claim  that  the difference in t reatm ent  is 
designed to prom ote m arriage is not  com pat ible with the prohibit ion on m arital 
status discrim inat ion under Art icle 14. The prom ot ion of m arriage above other 
form s of fam ily is also not  j ust ified by Art icle 12. 
O-V14 There appears to be an assum pt ion in the previous case law that  because 
the r ight  to m arry is protected separately under Art icle 12 then it  must  follow that  
special legal privileges for  those who are m arr ied are just ifiable. 13 I  disagree with 
this interpretat ion. Art icle 12 provides not  only for a r ight  to m arry but  also to 
found a fam ily and States have been offered a wide m argin of appreciat ion by 
virtue of the addit ional phrase ‘according to nat ional laws governing the exercise of 
this r ight ’. 14 
States should not , by virtue of Art icle 12, im pede the r ight  to m arry and found a 
fam ily but  this is not  the sam e as a requirem ent  to act ively prom ote m arriage 
above other form s of fam ily. I  would also suggest  that  it  does not  in it self give 
States perm ission to act ively prefer the m arital fam ily to other form s of fam ily in it s 
laws and fiscal policies. 
O-V15 Analogy on this point  m ay be m ade to t he protect ion for freedom  of religion 
in Art icle 9. There is no suggest ion that  States m ust  act ively prom ote a religion, or 
give addit ional benefit s to cit izens who have religious beliefs over those given to 
those who do not .  To do so would be cont rary to the Convent ion as a fundam ental 
aspect  of Art icle 9 is the r ight  to freedom  from  religion, the right  to have no 
religious belief. (Buscarini v. San Marino 1999)  Just  as States should not  prefer one 
religious organizat ion or belief over other (or none)  under Art icle 9, they also 
should not  prefer one m ethod of founding a fam ily over another under Art icle 12. 
                                                 
13
 See for example Shackell v. United Kingdom (2000) ;  Gas v. France (2014) . 
14
 See for example the pat ience demonstrated by the Court  in the line of cases brought  by t rans people 
seeking access to marr iage prior  to Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) , and the cases brought  by same-
sex couples:  Rees v. United Kingdom (1987) , Cossey v. United Kingdom (1991) ;  Sheffield and Horsham 
v. United Kingdom (1999) , Schalk and Kopf v. Aust r ia (2011) . 
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Even if the m ajorit y in this Court  would not  go so far as to agree that  there should 
also be freedom  from  m arriage under Art icle 12, the prohibit ion of m arital status 
discrim inat ion under Art icle 14 at  a m inim um supports the proposit ion that  spouses 
(and now civil partners)  should not  be t reated m ore favourably than sim ilarly 
situated unm arried adults who have form ed fam ilies in other ways than through 
m arriage, or who have not  form ed fam ilies at  all. 
O-V16 In a recent  j udgm ent  the Suprem e Court  of Berm uda declined to follow our 
precedent  in Gas v. France (2014)  that  sam e-sex couples (who were not  perm it ted 
to m arry at  the t im e in France)  could just ifiably be t reated the sam e as unm arried 
heterosexual couples because m arriage confers a ‘special status’. Hellm an J was 
crit ical of our reasoning and unable to see any rat ional basis to j ust ify prohibit ing 
sam e-sex couples from  adopt ing on the sam e term s as spouses. (A and B v. 
Director of Child and Fam ily Services and At torney General 2015)  He found no 
just ificat ion for t reat ing unm arried heterosexual and sam e-sex couples less 
favourably than spouses and I  have to agree with this. This follows the UK Suprem e 
Court  finding in 2004 that :  
Treat ing som e as autom at ically having less value than others not  only causes pain 
and dist ress to that  person but  also violates his or her dignity as a hum an being… 
such t reatm ent  is dam aging to society as a whole. (Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza 
2004, per Lady Hale, para 132) 
Although these decisions are not  binding on this Court  they are highly persuasive as 
decisions from  nat ional superior  courts interpret ing the Convent ion in line with 
nat ional law. Giving spouses a ‘special status’ above that  of other form s of fam ily 
and relat ionship t reats everyone else as having less value than spouses and on that  
basis cannot  be just ified under the Convent ion. Having therefore concluded that  
prom ot ing m arriage is not  a legit im ate aim  there is no need to consider whether it  
is proport ionate. 
O-V17 In theory the State could overcom e this problem  by extending the spousal 
privileges to other form s of fam ily but  this would alm ost  inevitably shift  the 
discrim inat ion onto single people and, in the context  of this case, have a disast rous 
im pact  on tax revenue. Therefore, the next  quest ion is whether the best  way to 
rem edy this m arital status discrim inat ion is to abolish the tax exem pt ion altogether. 
The UK claim s that  the other purpose of the tax exem pt ion is to provide financial 
security on the death of a spouse. As I  have concluded that  others, such as the 
applicants, could be sim ilarly situated to spouses, and it  m ust  be the case that  
som e people would be wealthy enough to cont inue to enjoy financial security on the 
death of their spouse despite paying inheritance tax, it  would be m ore rat ional to 
dist ribute this part icular privilege on the basis of financial need rather than m arital 
status. I n general, I  would recom m end that  privileges associated with m arriage 
should be abolished and where they are valuable for a purpose other than m erely 
prom ot ing m arriage should be allocated on a different , non-discrim inatory, basis, 
such as financial need rather than a preferred fam ily status. 
O-V18 The final part  of the Art icle 14 test  is whether the Governm ent  is within it s 
m argin of appreciat ion in t reat ing the applicants less favourably than spouses or 
civil partners. There is a m argin of appreciat ion for the state in ‘assessing whether 
and to what  extent  differences in otherwise sim ilar situat ions just ify differences in 
t reatm ent ’. (Stec v. United Kingdom  2006, para 51)  The m argin of appreciat ion is 
wide in relat ion to taxat ion m at ters but  this does not  give the Governm ent  a 
com plete exem pt ion from  abiding by Art icle 14 where they have created hardship 
or injust ice. I t  is also wider where there is a lack of agreem ent  between the laws of 
m em ber states. On this issue, there has been a series of case law that  has allowed 
governm ents to discrim inate on the basis of m arital status and I  hope this 
j udgm ent  m arks the beginning of the end for t hat  line of reasoning. There is a wide 
m argin of appreciat ion but  states m ust  now be on not ice that  it  will no longer be 
acceptable to discrim inate on the basis of marital status by privileging m arriage 
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through the tax system  and in other ways. The right  to m arry does not  include a 
r ight  to ext ra privileges or m ore advantageous t reatm ent  on the basis of that  
m arriage because the state should not  favour one form  of fam ily life over another.  
O-V19 In the circum stances of this part icular case, I  find that  these applicants have 
failed to dem onst rate hardship sufficient  to overcom e the UK’s m argin of 
appreciat ion. Their assets, as reported to this Court , are m ore than adequate to 
cover their tax liabilit y without  them  having to sell the fam ily hom e and on that  
basis they will not  suffer a part icular hardship that  suggests a tax exem pt ion ought  
to be extended to them . However, this Court  has been far too deferent ial to both 
the inst itut ion of m arriage and the States’ m argin of appreciat ion in respect  of 
m arriage’s supposed ‘special status’ at  the expense of properly enforcing the non-  
discrim inat ion provision of Art icle 14. There is no legit im ate reason to give spouses 
privileges over and above other fam ily form s but  extending this privilege to siblings 
(part icularly in this context  where there is no evidence of significant  financial 
hardship for the applicants)  would m erely exacerbate the problem . As such, I  
reluctant ly concur with the m ajorit y’s conclusion, albeit  for  different  reasons, 
though I  would st rongly recom m end that  the UK considers ways to withdraw its 
exist ing spousal privileges and redist r ibute them  (where necessary)  on a m ore 
rat ional basis than m erely prom ot ing m arriage. 
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